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Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Arbitration Act is an annual project of the Journal of Dispute
Resolution.2 The project examines court opinions from the past year which have
interpreted state versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A.").' Currently,
thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted arbitration statutes
based on the U.A.A.' The goal of the Journalof Dispute Resolution in creating
this project is to promote uniformity in interpretation of the U.A.A. by describing
the decisions and rationales of recent court opinions.
II.

SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration

or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.'
This section allows the court to grant deference to the validity of an arbitration
agreement when a dispute arises over the control of a private agreement.

1. This project was written and prepared by Journal ofDispute Resolution candidates under the
direction of Associate Editor in Chief Carol J. Creamer and Note and Comment Editor Greg W.
Pearman.
2. See Recent Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1994 J. DIsP. RESOL. 311; Recent
Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL 397; Recent Developments: The
Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1992 J.DISP. RESOL 411; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1991 J. DIsP. RESOL 417; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1990 J. DIsP.
RESOL 471; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DISp. RESOL. 237; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1988 J. DIsP. RESOL. 247; Recent Developments: The
Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1987 J. DISP. RESOL 177; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1986 J.DIsP. RESOL 169; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 J.DISP.
RESOL 173; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 J. DIsP. RESOL. 207; Recent
Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 48 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1983).
3. UNIF. ARBtTRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985). This project researched court opinions
from September 1993 through December 1994.
4. Jurisdictions that have adopted arbitration statutes based on the U.A.A. are Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
5. U.A.A. § 1.
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6
Arbitration proceedings have consistently been favored in most jurisdictions. To
further encourage arbitration, courts have been rather lenient in evaluating the
technical aspects of agreements by stretching the issues subject to arbitration and
severing arbitration clauses from contracts to find them valid.

A. Technicalities of a Valid Agreement
As with all contracts, arbitration agreements must meet certain requirements
for a court to deem them valid? In Ehresman v. Bultynck & Co.," the Michigan
Court of Appeals determined that the parties' signatures were not required
elements for a valid arbitration agreement.9 The plaintiff in Ehresman purchased
stock in Bultynck when he became employed at the company as an accountant.'
Bultynck required that Ehresman agree to three contracts: an employment
agreement, a stock redemption agreement, and a deferred compensation plan
Both the stock
agreement, as a condition of becoming a shareholder."
a
dispute arose. 2
if
arbitration
required
agreement
employment
and
redemption
Some time after accepting the agreements, Ehresman resigned from his
3
position, left Bultynck and took a number of the company's clients with him.'
Since the stock redemption agreement contained a covenant not to compete,
Bultynck filed a demand for arbitration. 4 Arbitrators found and the trial court
affirmed that all three agreements were valid, even though Ehresman had not
signed them.'5
In looking at Michigan's version of Section 1 of the U.A.A., the court of
appeals found that no language specifically requires a written instrument to be
signed by either or both of the parties) 6 The court looked to prior cases where
it had held that written arbitration agreements do not have to be signed in order
7
to be binding when mutuality of assent is established. The court approved the
principles of 17 C.J.S. Contracts Section 62 (1963):
[A] signature is not always essential to the binding force of an
agreement, and whether a writing constitutes a binding contract even
though it is not signed or whether the signing of the instrument is a
condition precedent to its becoming a binding contract usually depends

6.

E.g., Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Finstad, 888 S.W.2d

7.

Id.

8.

511 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).

9.

Id. at 726-27.

10.

Id. at 725.

11.
12.

Id.
Id.

13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 726.
Id.
Id.
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on the intentions of the parties. The object of a signature is to show
mutuality or assent, but these facts may be shown in other ways...
18

The court found that Ehresman accepted delivery of the agreements and operated
under their terms, conveying assent to the written contracts. 9 Thus, Ehresman
2
was bound to the arbitration terms even though he did not sign the agreements. "
21
In addition to enforcing unsigned arbitration agreements, courts have been
22
lenient in determining if parties have met statutory notice requirements. In Soil
Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Environmental, Inc., the court did not interpret the
word "underline" narrowly.23 Instead, the court determined the meaning of
"underline" was to emphasize or cause to stand out.24 The parties in Soil
Remediation entered into a contract that stated in boldface type, with letters
slightly larger than those in the font used for the text, that the contract was subject
to the arbitration code of South Carolina,25 which provides that the notice "shall
be typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber stamped prominently, on the first
page of the contract and unless such notice is displayed thereon the contract shall
not be subject to arbitration."26
The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the primary fundamental rule
of the statutory construction of the legislature is to give full effect to the intent
and purpose of the statute.27 The court found the purpose of the notice
requirement is to let the contracting parties know that the contract requires
arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. 28 In rejecting a bright-line
ordinary meaning rule, the court reasoned that this type of rule would not allow
the notice to be computer printed because the statute requires the text to be
"typed."29 The court in Soil Remediation Company held that the notice satisfied
3
the purpose completely because it was printed in all-capital, boldface letters. "
The Texas Court of Appeals also faced a notice question in Al's Formal
Wear of Houston, Inc. v. Sun. 3 However, in Al's Formal Wear, the court found
an arbitration agreement invalid when the parties did not follow the notice

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 726-27.
21. Ehresman v. Bultynck, 511 N.W.2d 724 (Mich Ct. App. 1994).
22. Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 253 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), cert.
granted, (July 26, 1995).
23. Id.at 254.
24. Id. at 256.
25. Id. at 254. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a)(Law. Co-op. 1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id.at 255.
30. Id. at 257.
31. 869 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 8
JO URNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1995, No. 2

requirements of the Texas General Arbitration Act.32 In Al's Formal Wear, Sun
The
entered into a contract with a formal shop to produce photographs"
contract contained a provision that disputes would be subject to arbitration.3'
The arbitration provision appeared on the back of the contract and was not
underlined. 5
Article 224-1 of the Texas General Arbitration Act provides that an
agreement will not be arbitrated "unless notice that a contract is subject to
arbitration under this Act is typed in underlined capital letters, or is rubber
stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract." 6 The court determined
that this article supplants the common law and requires arbitration agreements to
be in a particular form to be enforceable. 7 Therefore, the court held the
arbitration agreement was not enforceable because the parties did not comply with
the notice provisions of the Texas statute:"
Notice requirements were also a disputed issue when the Supreme Court of
Montana determined that Montana's notice statute for arbitration agreements was
not preempted by Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A."). 39 In
Casarotto v. Lombardi, the parties entered into a contract for a franchise that
included an arbitration clause."' Instead of including the arbitration provision on
with Montana law, the provision was written
the front of the agreement to comply
4
1
contract.
the
of
page
ninth
the
on
The agreement would have complied with F.A.A. standards but it did not
comply with Montana's U.A.A. notice requirements, requiring the court to
determine how federal and state law worked together42 The Montana Supreme
Court concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt the entire field of
Furthermore, the F.A.A. does not
arbitration when it enacted the F.A.A.
require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so." The court
found that Montana's notice requirement does not "undermine the goals and
policies of the F.A.A." and is not preempted by the F.A.A. 5
Lack of compliance with Montana's U.A.A. notice requirements was also the
turning point for the dissent in Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc."

32.

Id. at 445.

33.
34.

Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.

39.

Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994).

40.

Id. at 933.

41.
42.
43.
44.

id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938-39.

45.

Id. at 938.
862 P.2d 26, 33 (Mont. 1993).

46.
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Montana's version of the U.A.A. specifically provides: "[n]otice that a contract is
subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed
thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."47 Since the arbitration
agreements in Chor did not comply with this statutory provision, the result was
an easy one for the dissent.48 However, the majority in Chor found that the
arbitration agreement was valid because the plaintiff provided no showing of fraud
or misrepresentation to treat the arbitration agreement any different than any other
contract.49
B. Issues Subject to Arbitration
Not only must parties comply with certain technical rules to create a valid
arbitration agreement, the issues submitted to arbitration must be those the party
agreed to arbitrate and subject to arbitration under a state statute. Furthermore,
when parties submit issues to arbitration, the arbitration panel's decision is an
absolute bar to relitigation of those issues.5" In BrougherAgency, Inc. v. United
Home Life Insurance Co.,5 United Home Life ("UHL") entered in to a general
agency agreement with Brougher, an agency that sold group life insurance policies
to small, self-insured companies.52 UHL provided coverage on the insurance
policies Brougher drafted and sold.53 As UHL's agent and an intermediary with
Lloyds of London, Brougher handled negotiations to obtain reinsurance for UHL
from Lloyds.5 "
When Lloyds and UHL submitted a dispute over reimbursement of claims to
arbitration, the panel found that Brougher was not an agent of Lloyds except as
to specific ministerial acts in administering the contract, that Brougher had no
binding authority and that neither party had committed fraud. 5" Brougher was
not a party in the arbitration hearing, and the arbitrators awarded judgment to
Lloyds.5 6 The trial court confirmed the panel's decision and certified Lloyds'
and Brougher's interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of their motions for
summary judgment.57
On appeal, Lloyds argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the
question if the arbitrator's conclusions concerning the issue of misrepresentation
were binding against Brougher and UHL under the doctrine of resjudicata, which

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 34. See MONT. CODE A.NN. § 27-5-114 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 32.
Brougher Agency, Inc. v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993).

51.

622 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1015.
Id.
Id.

55.
56.

Id. at 1015-16.
Id. at 1016.

57.

Id.
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provides that a judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action
between the same parties on the same claim.58 Indiana statutory law does not set
forth the issues subject to arbitration.59 Rather, the parties' agreement governs
the conditions, limitations, and restrictions upon an arbitrator in making an
award.6" Therefore, the court recognized that "[plarties are only bound to
arbitrate those issues which by clear language they have agreed to arbitrate;
61
arbitration agreements will not be extended by construction or implication."
In Angell Enterprises, Inc. v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co.,62 the
Indiana Court of Appeals was again faced with questions whether certain issues
were subject to arbitration and the scope of the arbitrator's power. 63 In this case,
64
Angel contracted with Haver, a general contractor, to construct a supermarket.
When a dispute arose, the parties agreed to submit their claims to arbitration under
the Owner's Liability Statute, which makes the owner directly liable to a
subcontractor for unpaid services on a project, but limits the owner's liability to
the amount the owner still owes to the general contractor.65 Under this statute,
the arbitrator awarded and the trial court confirmed a full settlement of the
subcontractors' claims against Angell.66
On appeal, the parties in Angell Enterprises,Inc. continued to disagree as to
whether a written arbitration agreement between a general contractor and Angell
applied to subcontractors as well. 67 The appellate court recognized that Angell
68
In
and the subcontractors did not enter into a written arbitration agreement.
the
benefit
to
intended
was
contract
that
the
addition, since there was no evidence
subcontractors, they could not increase their damages by prevailing under a thirdparty beneficiary theory.69 The court reasoned that the subcontractors' only
recovery was available under the Owner's Liability Statute which had already been
settled."
For a court to ascertain whether a claim can be arbitrated, it must determine
7
the issues within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. In Louisiana
Natural Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc.,72 the court

58. Id.
59. Id. at 1017.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 643 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id.at 364.
64. Id. at 363.
65. Id. at 364.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 365.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Louisiana Natural Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 458
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
72. 875 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
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determined that it should first look at the claims asserted on appeal to see if they
fell within the scope of the agreement and then should consider whether any such
claims were previously arbitrated.'The arbitration agreement in LouisianaNatural Gas Pipeline,Inc. ("LNGP")
stated that arbitration would be used by the parties if "Bludworth and LNGP
disagree as to the quality and authorization of the repair work and the amount due
therefor."' 4 The Texas Court of Appeals determined that LNGP's allegations that
Bludworth engaged in false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce with LNGP referred to the quality or authorization
of the work or the amount due. 5 Thus, the court held that all of LNGP's claims
were subject to arbitration."
When an arbitration agreement states that the arbitration panel may award
punitive damages, parties cannot argue that the panel has exceeded its power if it
chooses to award such damages." In Kennedy, Matthews, Landis, Healy &
Pecora,Inc. v. Young,7" the parties signed an arbitration agreement that stated:
"The undersigned parties hereby submit the present matter in controversy, as set
forth in the attached statement of claim ...to arbitration.. . . The undersigned
parties further agree to abide by and perform any awards rendered pursuant to this
agreement."79 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that "[hiaving agreed to
submit to arbitration respondent's claim, including the issue of punitive damages,
appellant cannot now assert that the panel exceeded its authority by hearing the
very issue appellant asked it to hear."8
While the issues subject to arbitration are usually governed by the agreement
itself, some states have created statutes that prevent arbitration in certain areas. 8
In Great PlainsMutual Insurance Co. v. Mutual ReinsuranceBureau,' the court
determined that an agreement to arbitrate was void because a Kansas statute
disallowed arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.83 The court relied on
the Tenth Circuit decision in Mutual ReinsuranceBureau v. Great PlainsMutual
Insurance Co.,8 4 which held that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401 (1994) is a law enacted

73. Id. at 461.

74. Id.
75.

Id. at 461-62.

76. Id. at 462.

77. Kennedy, Matthews, Landis, Healy & Pecora, Inc. v. Young, 524 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994).
78. 524 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 755.
80. Id.
81. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, No. 89-1226-SAC, 1994 WL
262691 (D. Kan. May 10, 1994); Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993); Buraczynski v. Eyring,
M.D., NO. 03A01-9402-CV-00053, 1994 WL 677487 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1994), appealgranted
(May 1, 1995).

82.
83.

No. 89-1226-SAC, 1994 WL 262691 (D. Kan. May 10, 1994).
Great PlainsMut. Ins. Co., 1994 WL 262691, at *2 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1994).

84.

969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 604 (1992).
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for the purpose of regulating the "business of insurance."85 With this precedent
86
at hand, the District Court of Kansas stated that the case was essentially closed.
When the issue of validity of an arbitration agreement in an insurance
contract arose again in FederatedRural Electric Insurance Co. v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co.,87 the District Court of Kansas was unable to quickly
dismiss the case by applying its earlier precedent. The plaintiff in Federated
Rural Electric Insurance Co. asked the court to declare void and unenforceable
arbitration provisions of insurance policies issued in Ohio. 88 The reinsurance
treaties were issued in Ohio and the parties agreed that the rule of lex loci
contractusresulted in Ohio law governing the interpretation of the treaties. 89
Ohio's version of the U.A.A. contained no exclusion of insurance contracts
from the arbitration agreements recognized as valid and enforceable. 90 Therefore,
the plaintiff in FederatedRural Electric Insurance Co. argued that the strong
public policy behind the Kansas statute's prohibition of arbitration agreements in
insurance barred Ohio's contrary law. 91 The court held that the Kansas public
policy expressed in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401 (1994) did not bar the application of
Ohio law and that the arbitration agreements were enforceable without
exception. 92
The question of the validity of an arbitration agreement governing insurance
also arose in Cannon v. Lane.93 The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that
health maintenance organizations are insurance companies and arbitration
agreements governing such groups are invalid under Oklahoma's version of the
U.A.A. 94 The Oklahoma version of the U.A.A. states that the "act shall not
apply to collective bargaining agreements or contracts with reference to insurance
except for those contracts between insurance companies." 95
In making its determination that health maintenance and health insurance
organizations are essentially the same, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on
three principles.96 First, like health insurance organizations, health maintenance
organizations must forward an application for a license to the State Insurance
Commissioner to review fiscal responsibility. 97 Second, the court reasoned that
health maintenance companies are merely alternatives to health insurance with

85.

GreatPlainsMut. Ins. Co., 1994 WL 262691 at *2. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1994),

repealed by 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 155.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
874 F. Supp. 1204 (D.Kan. 1995).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993).
Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1237.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
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periodic payments designed to help with health care.98 Finally, the court found
that health maintenance organizations are essentially health insurance companies
because the definition of "Insurance" under the "Authorization of Insurers and
General Requirements" lists health maintenance organizations as an insurance
companyf 9 Since the health maintenance organization was essentially an
insurance company, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the contract in
question referred to insurance and was expressly excluded from the provision of
the U.A.A.' 00
Unlike insurance contracts where arbitration agreements are often void, the
Tennessee Appellate Court upheld a contract for arbitration between a physician
the plaintiffs signed
In Buraczynski v. Eyring, MD.,
and his patient.'
arbitration agreements prior to undergoing medical treatment by Dr. Eyring. °3
When disputes arose over the medical services rendered, Dr. Eyring moved to
compel arbitration.0 4 In denying his motion, the trial court reasoned the
by the state arbitration statute and lacked
agreement was not one 0contemplated
5
sufficient consideration.1
In making Tennessee's first assessment of the validity of an arbitration
agreementbetween a physician and patient, the Tennessee Court of Appeals looked
to the state's Uniform Arbitration Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301
(1995).106 The statute does not carve out an exception to bar its application to
medical malpractice arbitration agreements.0 7 However, the statute also does
not provide special treatment for such agreements."'0 During its assessment, the
court was concerned that unlike the bounds of a typical contractual relationship
which are delineated by a written document, the bounds in a physician/patient
relationship are constantly in flux, necessitating more open-ended agreements.0 9
Despite these considerations, the court determined that the legislature should be
the body to prohibit physician/patient arbitration agreements." 0 The court found
that the arbitration agreements were enforceable under the statute and that Dr.
Eyring's contractual agreement to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator was
adequate consideration."'

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Buroczynski, 1994 WL 677487 at *3.
102. No. 03A01-9402-CV-00053, 1994 WL 677487 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1994).
103. Id. at*1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-301 (1995).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Even though the Tennessee legislature was silent on the validity of
physician/patient arbitration agreements, some states that have adopted the U.A.A.
specifically list the topics excluded from arbitration." 2 The Kansas legislature
stated that arbitration agreements in employee/employer contracts are void.' '
The Kansas version of the U.A.A., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401 (c)(2) (1994), prevents
contracts between an employer and employees or their respective representatives
from contracting a valid arbitration agreement."' The defendant in Baxter v.
John Weitzel, Inc." 5 argued that the language in Section 5-401(c)(2) referred
only to labor contracts or collective bargaining agreements and not to contracts
between an employer and a single employee." 6 Yet, when the court evaluated
the legislative history behind the provision, it found no indication of organized
labor opposition to the bill."' The court gave the provision its ordinary
meaning and determined that all employment contracts are exempt from the
Kansas U.A.A." 8
Unlike Baxter, an employee in Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Finstad"9
signed a specific arbitration agreement that he would arbitrate any dispute, claim
or controversy that would arise between him and his firm or a customer, or any
other person. 2 ° Since the parties agreed that a valid arbitration agreement
existed, the Texas Court of Appeals need only determine if the arbitration
agreement encompassedthe employee's allegations against Smith Barney Shearson
of slander, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 2 '
The employee's registration with the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") led the rules of
these two organizations to govern the dispute.' 22 Both codes provide for the
arbitration of disputes "arising out the business of a member."' 23 The court had
to determine whether the employee's allegations arose out of the business of
The court found that
Shearson, the employee's work, or termination. 2"
allegations concerning all significant aspects of the employment relationship
between Shearson and the employee, Finstad, were subject to arbitration. 2s The
court held that Shearson's acts of filing false information about Finstad with the
NASD and IRS, telling clients that Finstad had been terminated for cause, firing

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Baxter v. John Weitzel, Inc., 871 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 857.
871 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 860.
888 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 888 S.W.2d at 115.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 117.
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Finstad and giving him one hour to move and pressuring Finstad to recommend
securities sponsored by the company were all subject to arbitration.' 26
C. Severability of Arbitration Clausesfrom a Contract
When the terms of a contract are the center of a dispute, an arbitration clause
within the questioned contract is severable from the contract and binding on all
parties."' In Jackson Mills, Inc. v. B.T Capital Corp.,'28 the plaintiff brought
an action asking the court to find that a shareholder agreement, which contained
an arbitration clause, was null and void.'29 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina's holding complied with "the general rule that the duty to arbitrate under
an arbitration clause in a contract survives termination of the contract.""' The
Jackson Mills court further stated that it did not render arbitration agreements
irrevocable under all circumstances.' 3' "[Wihen a party has valid grounds upon
which to challenge the arbitration clause itself[,] . . . arbitration may be
avoided."'" 2 Since there was no challenge to the validity of the arbitration
agreement, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that the parties' dispute
was controlled by arbitration.'
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that challenges to a
contract do not affect the arbitration agreement in Holmes v. Coverall North
America. 34 The court recognized that the parties had exchanged mutual
promises to arbitrate disputes under their contract with each promise providing
consideration for the other.'
The Maryland Arbitration Act states that in
adjudicating a petition for an order of arbitration or a stay pending arbitration, the
consideration of the existence of an arbitration agreement is severable. 36 "The
scope of the court's involvement
extends only to a determination of the existence
1
of an arbitration agreement.'

126.

Id. at 116-17.

127. Jackson Mills, Inc. v. B.T. Capital Corp., 440 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1994); Holmes v. Coverall
North America, Inc., 649 A.2d 365 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
128. 440 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1994).
129.

Jackson Mills, Inc., 440 S.E.2d at 878.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
649 A.2d 365 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 370-71.
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D. Necessity of a Valid Contract
In Anderson County v. Architectural Techniques Corp.,3 ' the appellants

argued that if the contract containing an arbitration clause is not legally
enforceable, then the arbitration clause could not be utilized by either party.' 39
The Appellants contended that the agreement between the parties was not binding
because it merely laid groundwork for future contracts between the parties. 4 °
However, the court found that the contract was clearly an agreement between the
parties to govern future services and satisfied the requirements of a binding
contract. ""

The contract between the parties in Anderson County specifically provided
that: "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to
this agreement, arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be decided by arbitration ... .,, 4 The court concluded that this arbitration
agreement met the requirements of Tennessee's version of the U.A.A. and the
parties should submit controversies to arbitration.'
Unlike Anderson County, where the court granted authority to the arbitrators
to settle the dispute, the court in Florida Education Association/United v.

Sachs"44
' determined that the existence of a valid contract was a question for the
court rather than the arbitrator.'4 5 After reviewing the filings below, the court
found that a valid contract and arbitration clause never existed.' 46 Thus, the
court reversed the order of the trial
court that deferred to the arbitrator's decision
47
on the existence of a contract.
In Phillips v. ACS Municipal Brokers, Inc.,' 48 the court stated that the

Texas U.A.A. only applies "when a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties to the agreement or the contract.', 49 The Texas act focuses
on the parties to an agreement and not the transaction itself. 5 ° The court
determined that there was no evidence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate and
that the separately executed registration agreements between the parties and
National Association of Securities Dealers were not agreementsbetween the parties
as contemplated by the Texas act. 5'

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

No. 03A01-9303-CH-00 110, 1993 WL 346473 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1993).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
627 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
888 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 876.
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E. Additional Facets of Section 1

In determining the validity of arbitration agreements, courts must also
consider if the agreements violate any constitutional provisions. In City of
Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc.,'

the Supreme Court of South Dakota found

that a state statute authorizing arbitration involving a municipal party was not
unconstitutional.' 53 R.E. Lien entered into a contract with the city of
Chamberlain for the construction of water mains and sewer lines.'54 When a
dispute arose over the work, the city refused to pay Lien, and Lien filed a demand
for arbitration.' Since the agreement did not contain an arbitration clause, the
city requested, and the trial court granted, a motion to quash and stay the
arbitration proceeding. 6 The circuit court found that S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 21-25A-1 (1987), which compelled the city to arbitrate under the American
Institute of Architects' standard form, violated Article III, Section 26, of the South
Dakota Constitution as a delegation of a municipal function."7
South Dakota law (Section 21-25A-1) sets out the conditions necessary for
agreement in South Dakota to be valid and does not exclude
arbitration
an
municipalities from entering into arbitration agreements.' 58 Article III, Section
26 of the South Dakota Constitution provides in part that: "The Legislature shall
not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money,
property, effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or levy taxes, or to select a
capital site, or to perform any municipal functions whatever. '
The Supreme Court of South Dakota found that Section 21-25A-1 does not
violate Article III, Section 26, of the South Dakota Constitution, "as it does not
delegate to any 'special commission, private corporation or association' the
municipal power to contract.'' 6 ° The court stated that the municipalities should
not be able to denounce their ability to arbitrate if they have the ability to freely
enter into such agreements."'

152.

521 N.W.2d 130 (S.D. 1994).

153. City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130, 133 (S.D. 1994).
154. Id. at 131.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 133. South Dakota law states:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a
written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. This chapter also applies to arbitration
agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25A-1 (1987).

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id.
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Additional changes under Section 1 of the U.A.A. occurred in DeGroot v.
FarmersMutual Hail Insurance Co. of Iowa,6 2 where the court held that the
decisions of appraisers were not synonymous with rulings of arbitrators and were
not binding on the parties. 6 ' The plaintiff in DeGroot signed a hail insurance
policy that contained a provision stating:
In case the Insured and this company shall fail to agree as to the
amount of loss, then, on written demand of either, each shall select a
competent appraiser. . . The appraisers shall. . . select a competent and
disinterested umpire. . . . The appraisers and the umpire shall then
appraise the loss and an award in writing of any two shall determine the
amount of the loss.164
An Illinois Appellate Court determined that the agreement was void because
it deprived the individual of his right to resort to the court for redress of
grievances.165 The court determined that the parties in the agreement did not
agree to submit their dispute to binding arbitration by using the term
"appraisal."' 66
Beyond determining that appraisers are not arbitrators under Section 1 of the
U.A.A., a court found that arbitration can be precluded by a valid release when
a contract expressly provides for arbitration.' 67 In USAA Property & Casualty
Co. v. Brady,'6 8 the defendant, Brady, settled with USAA and signed a release
of all claims for uninsured motorist benefits arising from an automobile
accident.' 69 After signing the release, she demanded arbitration with USAA
regarding the same uninsured motorist coverage for the identical accident. 70
USAA filed for a declaratory judgment and the trial court determined that the
release was valid. 7' The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the release made
all of Brady's arbitration claims invalid. 7 2
As a general rule, courts are willing to stretch ambiguous statutes governing
arbitration agreements to find a valid contract. However, if a law clearly
disallows arbitration by particular parties or regarding a certain issue, courts have
applied the plain language of the statute. With the cost of litigation increasing,
judicial support of arbitration can only continue to increase. Since arbitration
enjoys strong judicial support, attorneys should draft contracts with arbitration

162.

643 N.E.2d 875 (III. App. Ct. 1994).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

DeGroot v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co. of Iowa, 643 N.E.2d 875, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id.
USAA Property & Casualty Co. v. Brady, 867 P.2d 203 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

168.

Id.

169.
170.

Id. at 204.
Id.

171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 205.
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clauses to avoid causing their clients to incur the larger fees and additional hours
required by civil litigation.

III.

SECTION

2:

PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION

Section 2 of the U.A.A. requires the court to compel arbitration when there
In making the
is an arbitration agreement and one party refuses to arbitrate.'
determination whether to compel arbitration, the court is limited to deciding
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, whether the dispute involved is within
the scope of the agreement and whether the right to arbitrate was waived.'74
The court is not free to examine the merits of the controversy.' 75
A. Agreement Between the Parties
Applying state statutes similar to Section 2 of the U.A.A., courts have
addressed whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between two parties.' 76 The
Illinois Court of Appeals, in City of Peru v. Illinois Power Co.,' held that
third-party beneficiaries of an agreement are not parties to the arbitration
provisions of the agreement and therefore, cannot be compelled to participate in
arbitration.'
In Teamsters Union Local 340 v. Portland Water District,7 9 the
collective bargaining agreement had expired and in an effort to protest, the
employees parked their cars at a location in violation of a district parking
policy.'
One employee was later fired for this action and his union sought
arbitration.' 8' The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that once a
collectivebargaining agreement expires, the parties lose their contractual rights and
are no longer under an obligation to arbitrate.' 82 This obligation ends unless the
grievance involved a right that vested or a fact that occurred while the bargaining
agreement was in effect.'8 3 The court determined that the employee's grievance,
that he was terminated without "just cause," did not involve such a right.'84
In Chicago Insurance Co. v. Tarr, the insured sought arbitration against
Travelers Insurance Company, the insured's primary insurance carrier, but did not
seek to compel arbitration with Chicago Insurance Company, a secondary

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

U.A.A. § 2(a).
Chicago Ins. Co. v. Tan, 638 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Messa v. State Farm Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1167, 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
Chicago Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d at 108.
630 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 457-58.
651 A.2d 339 (Me. 1994).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 342.
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insurance carrier.'
The insured argued Chicago Insurance was bound by
Travelers' arbitration clause because Chicago's policy stated that Chicago was
bound by the "terms and conditions" of Travelers' insurance policy. 86 Travelers
settled before arbitration and withdrew its defense arbitrator, so the arbitration was
"
done ex parte. 87
' The Florida District Court of Appeals stated that an ex parte
arbitration award would not be compelled unless the insurance policy provided for
ex parte arbitration. 88
' The court found that neither policy provided for ex parte
arbitration,' 89 and that the insured should have filed an application to compel
Chicago to arbitrate so the lower court would have resolved the issue of whether
Chicago was obligated to arbitrate. 9 °
In deciding whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, three courts have
recently considered the effect conditions precedent and procedural requirements
have on arbitration agreements. In City of Alamo v. Garcia,191 a contract
specified that before a party could compel arbitration, written notice of the demand
for arbitration must be given to another party within a reasonable time.' 92 The
contract also required that the party compelling arbitration appoint an arbitrator
and send both a copy of the notice and the appointment to the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA").' 93The city of Alamo filed a notice with the
court, directed to Garcia and the AAA, but did not appoint an arbitrator, nor
indicate whether a copy of the notice was actually sent to the AAA. 94 The
Texas Court of Appeals held that the city did not comply with the contractual
requirements and therefore, was not entitled to have the dispute submitted to
arbitration.' 95
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 900 v. Suburban Bus Division of the
Regional TransportationAuthority,196 the Union submitted a grievance as called
for in the agreement, but there was a question of whether it followed the correct
agreement process.' 97 Pace, a bus division of the regional transportation
authority, argued that the grievance was delivered to the wrong person and was
untimely.' 98 Pace claimed the required grievance process was a condition
precedent to their obligation to arbitrate. 99 The Illinois Court of Appeals

185.

Chicago Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d at 107.

186.

Id.

187.

Id.

188.

Id.

189.
190.

Id. at 108.
Id.

191.

878 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
634 N.E.2d 469 (I11.App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 475.

199.

Id. at 472-73.
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determined that issues regarding conditions precedent are for the court to address
and procedural matters were issues for the arbitrator.2 ° ° The court held that an
alleged failure to properly complete the required grievance process was a
procedural issue and best decided by the arbitrator.2 '
In St. John Sanitary District v. Town of Schererville,20 2 St. John sought to
compel Schererville to arbitrate a dispute over the proposed increase of rates
Schererville charged St. John for wastewater treatment.2 3 The parties disagreed
as to whether the issue of rate increases was arbitrable.2"4 The Indiana Court of
Appeals held that the issue was arbitrable because it was at the heart of the
contract, and the court could not find with positive assurance that the issue was
non-arbitrable, without specific contract exclusion.2" 5
Schererville next argued that even if the contract included arbitration, St.
John failed to make good faith efforts to renegotiate the rate increase which was
a prerequisite to arbitration. 0 6 The court found St. John made several good faith
efforts to renegotiate and only sought to compel arbitration after Schererville
adopted the proposed rate change.20 7 St. John did not name an arbitrator as
required in the agreement, but the court found that neither party named an
arbitrator and that St. John tried several times to preserve its right to seek
arbitration. 0 8 The court concluded that fulfilling the prerequisites to arbitration
in this situation was futile.20 9 Therefore, St. John was not estopped from seeking
arbitration.210 The court stated that the party who refuses or fails to comply
with the grievance procedure will not then be permitted to prevent arbitration by
claiming that the procedure was not completed.21
B. Within The Scope of The Agreement
Once a court decides an agreement to arbitrate exists, the next question it
must address is whether the dispute involved is within the scope of the
agreement." 2 In PSI Energy Inc. v. AM4X, Inc., 213 AMAX did not disagree

200. Id. at 474.
201. Id. at 475.
202. 621 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
203.
204.

Id. at 1161.
Id.

205.

Id. at 1163.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1163-64.
Id. at 1164.
Id.

211.

Id.at 1163.

212. ChicagoIns. Co., 638 So. 2d at 108 (quoting Pierey v. Bd. of Washington County, Florida,
576 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
213. 644 N.E.2d 96 (Ind. 1994).
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about the validity of the arbitration clause.2" 4 The contract called for the parties
to arbitrate whenever an agreement is reached where a "gross inequity has
occurred."215 AMAX argued it had not agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether
a gross inequity of the contract had occurred.216 The agreement was silent on
this issue."' The Supreme Court of Indiana found that, absent language to the
contrary, the question if a gross inequity occurred was an arbitrable issue.2" 8
The court based its decision on the fact that the parties chose all-encompassing
language in the arbitration agreement and both sides bargained for each term of
the contract.2" 9 The court stated that to rule on the issue of whether a gross
inequity occurred would be deciding the merits of the controversy. 2
In Messa v. State Farm Insurance Co.,221 Messa filed a claim under the
uninsured motorist provisions of its policy.222 State Farm denied the claim, and
Messa filed a petition to enforce the policy's arbitration agreement.223 State
Farm filed an answer which alleged the claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. 224 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that a valid arbitration
agreement existed and that the statute of limitations claim was within the scope
225
of the arbitration agreement.
Therefore, it was an issue for the arbitrator and
226
court.
not the trial
The court in Grektorp v. City Towers of Florida,Inc.227 concluded that any
doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.2 28 City Towers filed a claim alleging that its president,
Grektorp, had breached his fiduciary duties by engaging in real estate transactions
with his wife and a corporation owned by both and by receiving commissions
from these transactions. 229 Grektorp moved to compel arbitration of City
Towers' claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement in his employment
contract. 2' ° The Florida Court of Appeals construed the clause that stated "any

214.

Id. at 99.

215.

Id. at 98.

216.

Id. at 99.

217.
218.

Id. at 100.
Id.

219.
220.

Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 99.

221.

641 A.2d 1167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).

222.

Id. at 1168.

223.

Id.

224.
225.

Id.
Id. at 1170.

226.
227.

Id.
644 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1994).

228.

Id. at 614.

229.
230.

Id. at 613.
Id. at 613-14.
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"
' Therefore, the claim was
controversy" to reflect a broad arbitration agreement.23
within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. 232
In Holmes v. CoverallNorth America, Inc.,233 Holmes purchased a franchise
agreement from Coverall."' Holmes later rescinded the agreement when it
found that Coverall was not approved to sell franchises until after the date of the
agreement. 5 When Coverall failed to reimburse Holmes for money paid in
connection with the agreement, Holmes filed a claim and Coverall sought to
compel arbitration. 236 Holmes claimed that rescission of the contract is an issue
for the court to decide in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists
between parties.237 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the issue
of rescission of an underlying contract is not a threshold issue, but one for
arbitration. 238 The court found the parties might attempt to avoid the binding
arbitration agreement by merely claiming that the formation of the entire contract
was faulty, under Holmes' position. 239 The court stated that such a rule would
be contrary to the intent of the arbitration law which states that courts decide only
whether an arbitration agreement exists and not issues related to the underlying
contract.240
A Maryland court also considered whether a dispute was within the scope of
the agreement in ContractConstruction,Inc. v. Power Technology Center Limited
Partnership.241 The court found the contract covered indemnification claims
22
arising out of complaints filed by third parties injured on the construction site.2 43
No part of the contract exempted claims for indemnification from arbitration.
Therefore, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that a third-party
indemnification claim was subject to arbitration.244 Powertech further argued
that CCI had waived its right to arbitration by demanding arbitration prior to
completing the procedural requirements designated in the contract.245 The
contract required the party to first submit its claim to an architect for
resolution.246 The court held that CCI had not waived arbitration because a
demand for arbitration of a third-party claim is not a "claim" as stated in the

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.at 614.
Id.
633 A.2d 932 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 932-34.
Id. at 935.
Id.at 937.
Id. at 938.
Id.
640 A.2d 251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Id.at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
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agreement. 247 Rather, the court stated it is simply an assertion that arbitration,
not litigation, is the proper forum for resolving the respondent's claims.248
C. Agreement Waived
If a court decides there is an agreement to arbitrate and the dispute involved
is within the scope of the agreement, it must next decide whether the right to
arbitrate has been waived.24 9 In City of Cottonwood v. James L. Fann
Contracting, Inc.,25° the city argued that the issue of timeliness is an issue for
the court and not the arbitrator. 251 The court stated that apart from repudiation,
timeliness is an issue of procedural condition for the arbitrator.25 2 In addition,
the party, seeking to prove that timeliness is an issue of repudiation for the court,
carries a heavy burden.253 The allegation must show clear evidence of prejudice
to the party and a demand for arbitration so egregiously untimely that it is
inconsistent with the intent to assert one's right to arbitrate.2 "4 The court found
that Fann had not repudiated arbitration because: (1) it did not file suit against the
city prior to compelling arbitration; (2) it did not acquiesce to a denial of
arbitration, and (3) its attempt to compel arbitration showed that it did not
voluntarily relinquish its right to arbitrate. 55
In City of Centralia v. Natkin & Co.,256 the city claimed that Natkin's
prelitigation delay, along with the prejudice the city had suffered, constituted a
waiver of Natkin's right to arbitration.257 The Illinois Appellate Court found
that preliminary settlement negotiations are not sufficient to waive arbitration if
held in good faith, even if a period of three years has elapsed. 8 The city
claimed that it was prejudiced because it incurred court costs and legal fees to sue
Natkin.259 On this point, the court concluded that the city could not claim
prejudice, because Natkin filed for arbitration after the city's complaint was filed
in court, and the city could have personally referred the matter to arbitration as
stated in the agreement.26 Finally, the city claimed arbitration should be stayed
because of the potential claim against it by a party not subject to the arbitration

247.

Id.

248.

Id.

249.

Chicago Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d at 108.

250.

877 P.2d 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

251.
252.
253.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 292.
Id.

254.

Id. at 291.

255.
256.

Id. at 290.
630 N.E.2d 458 (II1. App. Ct. 1994).

257.

Id. at 460.

258.

Id. at 461.

259.

Id.

260.

Id.
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agreement.26 ' The court disagreed, finding that prohibiting Natkin's right to
arbitration would destroy the same right in many construction cases because there
262
is often the potential for a third party to become involved in the case.
IV. SECTION

3: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS

Section 3 of the U.A.A. requires that parties follow the method of
263
If the
appointment of arbitrators specified in their arbitration agreement.
method for any reason cannot be followed, the court, on application of a party,
shall appoint an arbitrator.264 In Annapolis ProfessionalFirefightersLocal 1926
v. City of Annapolis, 265 the parties had an agreement to mediate in their
contract. 66 However, such mediation could not occur because the agency that
267
The
was to provide such mediation was disbanded due to budget cuts.
Maryland Court of Special Appeals was faced with the question of whether the
situation voided the whole mediation agreement or required the court to appoint
another mediator.268 The court decided that a written agreement to submit
disputes to any form of alternative dispute resolution, that is not otherwise against
public policy, would be enforced to the same extent as if the chosen method was
arbitration. 269 The court held that the mediation agreement was close enough to
arbitration to apply the U.A.A.27° and that the trial court could therefore appoint
another mediator.2 1
V. SECTION 5: HEARING REQUIREMENT

Section 5 of the U.A.A. provides the mandatory procedural requirements for
an arbitration hearing, unless parties otherwise provide for such in their
agreements.272 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided a case under
27
In Kovacs
this section of the U.A.A. in a claim for dissolution of marriage.
274
the parties agreed to submit their dispute to a Jewish court
v. Kovacs,
according to Jewish law.275 One spouse later argued that the proceedings were

261.

Id. at 462.

262.

Id. at 463.

263.
264.

U.A.A. § 3.
Id.

265.

642 A.2d 889 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).

266.

Id. at 891-92.

267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 895.

269.

Id.

270.

Id. at 894.

271.
272.

See id. at 895.
U.A.A. § 5.

273.

Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 428 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

274.

Id.

275.

Id. at 429.
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not in accordancewith the U.A.A. because her counsel was not permitted to make
opening or closing statements or cross-examine witnesses as required by the
U.A.A.276 The court held that parties may waive their rights under the U.A.A.
and submit their controversies to arbitration proceedings that do not meet all of
the U.A.A. requirements. 2" The court recognized the validity of the special
arbitration proceeding, as long as the parties voluntarily and knowingly agreed to
the procedures.27"
Another case where parties created their own procedural requirements for an
arbitration proceeding is Christian Dior, Inc. v. Hart Schaffner & Marx
("HSM"). 279 In Christian Dior, the plaintiff received an arbitration award for
HSM's breach of a license termination agreement.28 HSM claimed that the
arbitrator's refusal to subpoena Dior's president denied it the opportunity to crossexamine a material witness. 28' However, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded
HSM suffered no prejudice from the witness' absence.282 Both parties had
stipulated that the president had prematurely announced HSM's termination
agreement and that the president was acting for Dior.2"' The only issue for
arbitration was HSM's actions after the announcement and its impact on Dior." 4
The court found that HSM could not specify the nature of any testimony it sought
from the president, other than what was stipulated. 85 The court also concluded
the request for the president's appearance came too late and that HSM must accept
responsibility for his not appearing.286 HSM waited until the first day of
arbitration to demand that a subpoena be issued, it never listed the president as a
witness in the previous hearings, and the president lived in France, creating a real
hardship in his quickly appearing for the proceedings.287
VI. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Section 7 of the U.A.A. stipulates that fees for a witness in an arbitration
proceeding shall be the same as for a witness in the designated state court.2 88
This section of the U.A.A. was in dispute in Kerber v. Allied Group
Insurance,28 9 where the parties participated in statutory no-fault arbitration. 90

276.

Id. at 432.

277.
278.

Id. at 433.
Id.

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

637 N.E.2d 546 (I11.App. Ct, 1994).
Id. at 548.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id.

284.
285.

Id.
Id.

286.

Id.

287.
288.

Id. at 549, 552.
U.A.A. § 7(d).

289.

516 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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The arbitrator required Allied Group Insurance to pay Kerber's expert witness
fees.291 The no-fault arbitration rules promulgated by the state supreme court
required that each side pay their own expert witness fees.292 Therefore, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by requiring Allied Insurance to pay the witness fees.293 Kerber argued that the
no-fault rules should be read together with the U.A.A., but the court
disagreed.294 The court did not find the U.A.A. language to be controlling and
stated that when there is conflict between the two statutory provisions, the special
provision of the no-fault statute prevails over the general U.A.A. provision.295
VII. SECTION 8: AWARD
U.A.A. Section 8 requires that arbitration awards be written and signed.296
Further, it requires awards be made within the time specified by the parties'
agreement, or if none stated, by a time set by the court. 29" A party must notify
the arbitrator that the award has not been made within the time specified, or an
objection to such tardiness is waived. 298 Any objection must be made prior to
the party receiving the award.299

Section 8 of the U.A.A. was at issue in Bureau of Employee Relations v.
Maine State Employees Association, Seiu Local 1989,"'0 where the parties
proceeded to arbitrate the sole issue of whether the dispute was arbitrable.3 '°
The arbitrator found it was arbitrable, and the Bureau of Employee Relations filed
a motion to vacate the award.3 2 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found
that the U.A.A. does not define "award" but clearly decided that if the issue is
considered arbitrable, the parties are to proceed to arbitration without first
appealing the decision.30 3 The court held that an arbitrator's decision on whether
an issue is arbitrable is not an "award" and not appealable. 0- 4
The Illinois Appellate Court also looked at Section 8 of the U.A.A. in
Vascular Surgery Association v. Business Systems, Inc.3"' In this case, BSI did

290.

Id. at 569.

291.

Id.

292.

Id. at 570.

293.

Id.

294.

Id.

295.
296.

Id.
U.A.A. § 8(a).

297.
298.
299.
300.

U.A.A. § 8(b).
Id.
Id.
639 A.2d 638 (Me. 1994).

301.

Id. at 639.

302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 640.

304.

Id.

305.

628 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
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not object to an untimely award until after the arbitrator gave it's decision:"
The court concluded BSI had waived its objection to the tardiness of the
award.0 7 A dissenting arbitrator complained of the delay before the decision,
but the court ruled that the U.A.A. clearly requires that a "party" object.3 8 The
court stated that the policy behind the rule is to prevent a party from waiting to
see if the arbitrator's award is in its favor and then, if not, claim the ruling is
invalid because of delay.0 9

VIII. SECTION 9: CHANGE OF AWARD BY ARBITRATORS
Section 9 of the U.A.A. provides authority for arbitrators to modify or correct
awards based on an application from a party or on submission by the court.310
The modified or corrected award is subject to the provisions in Section 11, 12 and
13.311 Section 9 of the U.A.A. was addressed by the Florida District Court of
312
Appeals in Dade County Police Benevolent Association v. City of Homestead.
An arbitrator stated the employee was demoted for "just cause," but the demotion
penalty was "too excessive and severe."3 3 The court found that the arbitrator's
decision was ambiguous and remanded the matter to the arbitrator for
clarification.314
The Missouri Court of Appeals also applied Section 9 of the U.A.A. in
Heineman v. Charno.311 Charno argued that the entry of an amended award
involved reopening the hearing; therefore, Section 5 of the U.A.A. should
apply." 6 Section 5 of the U.A.A. provides that at the hearing parties are entitled
to be heard, present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.31 7 The Missouri
Court of Appeals held that changing an award under Section 9 does not require
an additional hearing.31 8 The court stated that Section 9 speaks of Sections 11,
12 and 13, but does not mention Section 5 and that the language of Section 9
clearly does not envision an additional hearing. 1 9

306. Id. at 287.
307, Id.
308. Id.
309, Id.
310.

U.A.A. § 9.

311.

Id.

312.
313.

642 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 25.

314.
315.

Id.
877 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 229.
U.A.A. § 5(b).
Heineman, 877 S.W.2d at 229.
Id.
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IX. SECTION 10:

FEES AND EXPENSES OF ARBITRATION

Section 10 of the U.A.A. provides that arbitrator's fees and expenses incurred
during arbitration shall be paid according to the award.- ° Section 10
specifically does not address payment of attorney fees,32 which was at issue in
Canon School District No. 50 v. W.E.S. Construction Co.32

In Canon, the

Supreme Court of Arizona held that the U.A.A. prohibits the arbitrator and
confirming court from awarding attorney's fees for the arbitration proceeding, but
the confirming court may award attorney fees incurred in the confirmation
hearing. 23 The court based its holding on the decision of a North Carolina case
with identical facts.324 The court stated the policy behind arbitration is to obtain
an inexpensive and speedy disposition of the controversy. 25 Any other decision
would encourage parties to go to court in confirmation proceedings for the sole
purpose of seeking attorney fees from the arbitration proceeding. 26
In Marsh v. Loffler Housing Corp.,327 the court also faced the question of

awarding attorney fees when the parties entered into an American Institute of
Architects standard construction contract ("AIA"). -28 According to the contract,
any documents attached to the contract became part of the agreement.329 The
first document attached was a Home Improvement Contract ("HIC"). 3- 0 The

HIC specifically provided that the homeowner would pay the contractor's attorneys
fees in the event that payment of the contract had to be enforced by legal
action."' The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided that the language of
the HIC must be read in relation to the dispute resolution provisions of the
AIA 323 Therefore, the arbitrator and the court had authority to award attorney
fees.

33

XII. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AWARDS
Unless a party urges the court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration

award, Section 11 of the U.A.A. provides for the natural confirmation of the

320.

U.A.A. § 10.

321.

Id.

322.

882 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1994).

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1278 (citing Nucor Corp. v. General Bearing Corp., 423 S.E.2d 747, 749-51 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 1278-79.
648 A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1087.
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award within a set time period.334 With such a high level of deference toward
confirming arbitration awards, trial courts do not have substantial discretion to
decide whether to confirm such awards. Yet, when an arbitration agreement and
state statute fail to restrict the issues subject to arbitration, the trial court is
allowed full discretion in deciding these issues.
A. Authority of the Trial Court
Trial courts do not have unfettered discretion to set aside arbitration
awards.335 Such awards only should be set aside "within the parameter of the
'
In Hardaway v. Goodwill,337 the
arbitration agreement or the statute."336
338
After
parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute involving an automobile accident.
39
confirmation.
the arbitration award was published, the defendant moved for
Although the plaintiff did not oppose confirmation, the trial court refused to
confirm the arbitration award, believing confirmation was a discretionary matter
4
and that the parties had not agreed to be bound to arbitration. ' The trial court
judge stated: "I am mainly setting it [the arbitration award] aside on discretion.
. . but I think there is considerable complaint about the award . . . . ""' The
Tennessee Court of Appeals held the reasons advanced by the trial court did not
to show the
support its refusal of confirmation because there was no evidence
3 42
U.A.A.
the
under
come
or
bound
be
to
intend
not
did
parties
Similarly, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals held that:
the trial court does not have any discretion and must confirm the award
unless one of the parties seeks to vacate, modify, or correct the award
within 90 days of delivery of the arbitrator's award, or unless there is
an issue presented to the trial court in the motion to confirm which was
not submitted to the arbitrator.343

334. Section 11 of the U.A.A. states: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an
award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying
or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13."
U.A.A. § 11.
335.

Hardaway v. Goodwill, No. 03-A-01-9403CV000113, 1994 WL 585767, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Oct. 19, 1994).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338.

Id. at *1.

339.
340.

Id.
Id. at *3.

341.

Id. at *4.

342.

Id.

343.. Moya v. Bd. of Regents, State Univ. Sys. of Florida, 629 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
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344
a career
In Moya v. Board of Regents, State UniversitySystem of Florida,

employee of the University of Central Florida was terminated after being
reprimanded for using inappropriate language. 45 In an arbitration proceeding,
the arbitrator awarded Moya reinstatement,
backpay and removal of a written
46
reprimand from his personal files.1
Moya filed a motion to modify the award more than ninety days after the
arbitrator's decision.347 The trial court promptly denied the motion."a On
appeal, the court determined that if a party objects to the terms of the arbitrator's
award, the party must petition the trial court within the ninety days or the trial
court must confirm the arbitration award.349
Despite the general rule that a trial court must confirm an arbitration award
in the absence of a motion to vacate, modify or correct the award,350 a trial court
is expected to exercise its discretion in certain instances. The Fifth District Court
of Appeals in Florida found that a trial judge did have discretion to change an
"
'
arbitration award pursuant to a properly raised defense.35
In Montalvo v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,' the parties agreed to arbitrate
a dispute arising from an automobile accident. 5 ' The arbitrator awarded
Montalvo $68,500 for his injuries in the accident." 4 Travelers failed to file a
petition to modify the award during the 90-day time period and Montalvo filed a
motion for confirmation of the award.355 Instead of upholding the award, the
trial court held Travelers responsible for only 50% of the arbitration award since
Montalvo could collect additional insurance funds under another policy.356 The
trial court concluded that each insurance company's proportionate share was onehalf of the total damages awarded because the policy limits under the insurance
contracts were the same.357 Since the issue of policy limits was not submitted
to the arbitration panel, the appellate court determined that the trial court had
discretion to confirm only half of the arbitration award.358
Unlike the decision in Montalvo, the court in Anderson County v.
Architectural Techniques Corp." 9 found that the record lacked proof that the

344.

629 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

345.

Id. at 283.

346.
347.

Id.
Id.

348.
349.
350.

Id. at 284.
Id.
Hardaway, 1994 WL 585767 at *3.

351.

Montalvo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 643 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

352.

643 So.2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id.

358.
359,

Id.
No. 03A01-9303-CH-00110, 1993 WL 346473 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1993).
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appellants "did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection" of no arbitration agreement. 6 Since the record did not confirm that
the parties had not discussed the lack of an arbitration agreement, the Western
3 61
Tennessee Court of Appeals found the arbitrator's award should be confirmed.
The First District Court of Appeals in Indiana also held that a trial court did
not exceed its scope of authority when it allowed a partner to continue the
partnership business after an arbitrator's order of dissolution.162 In Zeckel v.
3 63
Paskins,
Paskins sought partnership dissolution due to the misconduct of his
partner, Zeckel.3 64 Under the partnership agreement, the parties' dispute was
subject to arbitration. 365 The arbitrator granted Paskins relief, finding that
Zeckel willfully breached the partnership agreement. 66 Both parties asked the
3 67
trial court to confirm the arbitration award within the 90-day time period.
Paskins requested that the partnership not be liquidated, while Zeckel argued that
liquidation was mandatory.3 6' The trial court369confirmed the arbitration award
and allowed Paskins to continue the business.
in
Faced with the question of whether the trial court exceeded its authority 310
confirming the arbitration award by allowing Paskins to continue the business,
the court of appeals agreed with the lower court's decision.3 1' The court stated
that "the right of the innocent partner to continue the business following a
wrongful dissolution can supersede the terms of the partnership agreement."372
Coupling this principle with an unambiguous, complete and enforceable arbitration
award, the court found that the trial court correctly confirmed the arbitrator's
award. 373
B. Jurisdictionof the Trial Court
In addition to the requirements of Section 11 of the U.A.A., 74 Arizona
requires that applications for confirmation of an arbitrator's award be filed and
served "in the same manner in which complaints are filed and served in civil

360. Anderson County v. Architectural Techniques Corp., No. 03A01-9303-CH-00 110, 1993 WL
346473, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1993).
361. Id.
362. Zeckel v. Paskins, 625 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
363.
364.

625 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 1286.

365.

Id.

366.

Id.

367.

Id.

368.
369.

Id.
Id.

370.

Id. at 1285.

371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.
See .vupra note 334.
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of
actions.' 375 This additional requirement created a question of the jurisdiction
37 6
Contracting.
Fann
L.
James
v.
Cottonwood
of
City
in
court
trial
the
The parties in James L. Fann Contractingentered into a construction contract
which included an arbitration provision for disputes.37 The parties agreed an
engineer would be the initial interpreter of the contract and the judge for
acceptability of work.3 78 The agreement set up specific time limits for both the
79
engineer to render his decision and for a demand for arbitration.1 When a
dispute over the specified time limits arose, the trial court ordered the parties to
proceed to arbitration.38 ° After arbitration, the parties brought the case back to
the trial court to confirm the award without using the same manner in which
complaints are filed and served in civil actions.:'
The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121511 (1994) does not require commencementof a new action to confirm an award,
as long as the trial court's jurisdiction has been invoked and a pending action has
not formally concluded.382 The court stated: "the need to file for confirmation
as prescribed in the statute applies only to those situations in which the parties
have not been previously subjected to the jurisdiction of the court in connection
with the arbitration proceedings." 383 Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction over
confirmation even though the parties did not comply with specific provisions of
Section 12-1511.384
In an effort to give deference to the parties' decision to settle disputes
through arbitration, trial courts generally do not set aside arbitration awards.
However, when the parties' agreement does not include a certain issue or an
arbitration panel fails to decide an issue of the dispute, the trial court has
discretion to decide the issue. To avoid giving the trial court discretion to decide
issues that a party prefers to arbitrate, attorneys should be sure such issues are
included in the arbitration agreement.

375.

376.
377.
1994).
378.
379.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1511 (1994).

877 P.2d 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
City of Cottonwood v. James L. Fann Contracting, Inc., 877 P.2d 284, 286 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Id. at 287.
Id.

380.

Id. at 288.

381.
382.

Id.
Id. at 293.

383.

Id.

384.

Id.
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XI. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
Once an arbitration award has been rendered only under limited
circumstances will a court set aside the award under Section 12 of the U.A.A.385
A great amount of deference is afforded to the arbitration award because the award
was reached outside the confines of the court system. In fact, "[a] trial court does
not have unfettered discretion to set aside an award [but must set it] aside within
3 86
the parameter of the agreement or the statute.

In order to vacate an arbitration award, some courts have found or have
attempted to find nonstatutory reasons to vacate an arbitrator's award. For
example, when the provisions of Section 12 are so constraining that a party's right
to a jury trial is forfeited, then Section 12 will not be the exclusive method used
to vacate an award.387 Any attempts to expand Section 12 failed. For example,
adopt a "manifest disregard of the law"
the Supreme Court of Montana refused 8to
8

as the standard for vacating an award.1

385. U.A.A. Section 12 provides:
a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section
5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate
in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law
or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after delivery of
a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud or
other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are known or
should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other that stated in clause (5) of Subsection (a) the
court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement,
or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with Section 3, or if the award is
vacated on grounds set forth in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court may order
a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in
accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires the award to
be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award
is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
U.A.A. § 12.
386. Hardaway, 1994 WL 585767 at *3.
387. Williams v. Williams, 877 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Nev. 1994).
388. May v. First Nat'l Pawn Brokers, Ltd., 887 P.2d 185 (Mont. 1994).
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A. Procurement of Award by Corruption,
Fraud,or Undue Means
A court has the power to vacate an award when it finds that the award was
obtained by fraud, corruption, or undue means."' In Garrell v. Blanton, 90
respondent and appellant were real estate salesmen who submitted their dispute
over a real estate commission to arbitration.3 9' Arbitration was mandatory for
members of the National Association of Realtors, but was voluntary between nonmembers and members.392 Respondent was advised by the Board Grievance
Committee that arbitration was mandatory in this situation. 393 The two parties
arbitrated their dispute and appellant was awarded one-half of the real estate
commission. 94 Later, respondent learned that appellant's membership had
lapsed before arbitration, but he was reinstated without strict compliance with the
regulations. 395 Respondent attempted to vacate the award arguing that the
irregularities of appellant's membership status rose to the level of fraud or undue
means: w9 Respondent argued that he was compelled to arbitrate or lose his
membership privileges. 9
The Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to vacate the award because
respondent participated in the arbitration hearing without objecting to appellant's
membership status: 9' Appellant's membership status was questioned during the
arbitration hearing, but respondent continued with the arbitration hearing. 99 The
court stated that the respondent did not argue that the award itself was fraudulent
or unfair, only that the arbitration was unfair.49 ' The arbitration was not unfair
because respondent participated in the hearing without objecting to appellant's
membership status.4"'
B. ArbitratorPartiality,Misconduct, and Bias
A court shall vacate an award when it finds evident partiality by an
arbitrator." 2 The standard which constitutes "evident partiality" varies somewhat
amongjurisdictions. However, most courts by giving deferenceto arbitration have

389.
390.
391.

U.A.A. § 12(a)(1).
447 S.E.2d 840 (S.C. 1994).
Id.

392.

Id. at 841.

393.

Id.

394.

Id.

395.

Id.

396.
397.

Id.
Id.

398.

Id.

399.

Id.

400.

Id.

401.

Id.

402.

U.A.A. § 12(a)(2).
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stated that for evident partiality to be established, the allegation ". . . must be
direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or
speculative."'4' 3 Evident partiality is usually demonstrated ". . . where the arbiter
had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or a relationship with one of the
parties involved."40 4
In Pirsig v. Pleasant Mound Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,40s the insured
made a claim to Pleasant Mound Insurance for tools stolen from his farm. 0 6
After a dispute arose over the value of the stolen tools, the insured and the
insurance company agreed to arbitration under the terms of the policy. 4 7 Each

party selected an appraiser and the two appraisers selected a neutral appraiser. 4°8
The insurance company's appraiser and the neutral appraiser met a couple of times
before the appraisal hearing to exchange a list of the stolen tools and to arrange
a date and time for the hearing.40 9 These contacts were conducted with the
insured appraiser's knowledge.4"' After the insurance company's appraiser and
the neutral appraiser agreed on a value of the stolen tools, the insured's appraiser
moved to vacate the award because of the contacts between the other two
appraisers.4 '
The court refused to vacate the award, finding that the contacts between the
appraisers did not constitute evident partiality.4" 2 The court failed to see
evidence of partiality since the contacts were disclosed, they did not involve the
merits of the dispute, and there was "no long standing relationship between the
person to believe the neutral arbitrator
arbitrators that would lead a reasonable
41 3
would be partial to one party.1

Similarly, in May v. First NationalPawn Brokers, Ltd.,4 the court refused
to vacate an arbitration award for evident partiality solely because the arbitrator
had asked irrelevant questions and had "badgered" the party. 4 5 The court also
refused to vacate the award by adopting a "manifest disregard of the law"
standard.4 6 The court was reluctant to adopt a standard that was not provided
by statute or had not been adopted by other U.A.A. states.417 In the concurring

403. John E. Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. Wicklander-Zulawski & Assocs., 627 N.E.2d 348, 353 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1970)).
App. Ct. 1993) (quoting William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 266 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Ill.
404.
405.
406.

City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tex. App. Ct. 1994).
512 N.W.2d 342 (Minn.App. 1994).
Id. at 343.

407.
408.
409.

Id.
Id.
Id.

410.
411.
412.
413.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id.

414.
415.

887 P.2d 185 (Mont 1994).
Id at 189.

416.

Id. at 190.

417.

Id. at 191.
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opinion, Justice Trieweiler stated that "a manifest disregard of the law" is evidence
and should be included in the standard of review for vacating an
of partiality
18
4

award.

The court, in Giraldi By & Through Giraldi v. Morrell,419 also refused to
vacate an award for evident partiality solely because some of the arbitrator's
relatives were members of the health care profession. 42" The court stated that
the statute required more than just an appearance of possible bias or sympathy
toward a party. 42' Additionally, the court refused to impose an obligation on the
arbitrator to disclose which members of his family were in the health care
profession, stating that this matter could have been resolved by asking these
questions before confirmation as the arbitrator.422
In John E. Reid & Associates v. Wiklander-Zulawski & Associates,423 the
court also refused to vacate an award based upon evident partiality solely because
one of the witness' parents had a relationship with the arbitrator.424 One of the
party's attorneys revealed that a potential witness' parents had a personal and
business relationship with the arbitrator. 425 The opposing party tried to remove
the arbitrator for partiality, but the A.A.A. confirmed the arbitrator's
appointment.426
The court refused to vacate the award because the opposing party failed to
allege how the arbitrator's relationship with the witness' parents would lead the
arbitrator to favor that party. 42 7 The opposing party failed to show how the
witness' parents had an interest in the outcome of the arbitration because the
parents were in the formal wear business, while the arbitration itself concerned a
licensing agreement of a law enforcement training method.428
In Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,429 appellant sought to recover
damages through arbitration for an investment he made with the respondent and
later to vacate the arbitration decision. 43" An arbitration panel was formed to
hear the appellant's claim. 43' After the hearing was over, but before a decision
was rendered, one of the arbitrator's contended that another arbitrator should have
432
been classified as a securities industry arbitrator rather than a public arbitrator.

418.

Id. at 192.

419.

892 P.2d 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428,
429.
430.
431.
432.

Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
627 N.E.2d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 354.
Id.
878 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id.
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The arbitration panel resigned and referred the matter to a new arbitration
panel.433 When the new panel was formed, the appellant suggested that it review
the exhibits and taped recordings of the first hearing rather than hold a new
hearing.434 The second panel followed appellant's suggestion, and then issued
a decision dismissing appellant's claim.435 Appellant then moved to vacate the
second panel's decision arguing that the decision was based upon the biased record
of the first hearing.436
The motion to vacate the arbitration panel's decision was denied by the court
because the appellant failed to establish a nexus between the first and second
arbitration panels.437 The court found that the appellant's insistence upon using
the exhibits and recordings of the first hearing and that the appellant's knowledge
of the first panel's problems estopped him from complaining of the first panel's
defects.43 In essence, the appellant failed to demonstrate how the possible bias
of the first panel tainted the decision of the second panel.439
In Sheffield Assembly of God Church, Inc. v. American Insurance Co.,"'
a building contractor alleged evident partiality against an arbitrator because the
arbitrator was associated with an attorney that represented another church against
"
' The court denied the building
the building contractor ten years earlier.44
contractor's motion to vacate because the attorney did not become associated with
the arbitrator until the arbitrator had been selected for the arbitration, and it was
not until a decision was made that the arbitrator became aware that the attorney
When the
represented a party against the current building contractor."'
4
arbitrator discovered this information, he reported it to the A.A.A.."444
arbitrator.
as
appointment
his
affirmed
A.A.A.
the
review,
Subsequent to a full
The court concluded that nothing existed in the record that suggested bias.445
In Monday v. Cox,446 a homeowner and a homebuilder submitted a dispute
over a malfunctioning sprinkler to arbitration.44' After the homeowner received
nothing, the homeowner moved to vacate the award because of arbitrator bias.44

433. Id. The arbitration panel resigned to avoid having its decision reversed for signs of
impropriety.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436.

Id. at 761-62.

437.

Id. at 763,

438.

Id.

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

Id.
870 SW.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id.

444.
445.

Id.
Id.

446.
447.
448.

881 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/8

34

Gibbens et al.: Gibbens: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Uniform Arbitration Act

19951

The homeowner argued that the arbitrator was biased in favor of the homebuilder
because its attorney was a member of the same law firm that had previously sued
the arbitrator's construction company.449 It was one of the attorney's partners,
attorney himself, that had previously sued the arbitrator's
and not 45the
0
company.
The court denied the motion to vacate the award because there was no
evidence that the arbitrator knew the connection between the homebuilder's
"
' The arbitrator did not
attorney and the law firm that had previously sued him.45
52
The court also
discover the connection until after he had rendered a decision.
stated that no bias existed because the arbitrator had no personal or financial
relationship with the homebuilder or his attorney.453
C. Exceeding the Scope of Authority
A court shall vacate an award when an arbitrator exceeds his or her
powers.454 The scope of an arbitrator's authority is generally outlined in the
arbitration agreement itself.455 Therefore, an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers
when he or she ". . . makes an award that is inconsistent with the terms of the
parties agreement.""'' ,
In Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Hedrich,457 former employees of
Shearson Lehman Brothers commenced an arbitration proceeding against their
previous employer for money owed to them under a deferred compensation
plan.458 Under the compensation plan, a fully vested employee was to get his
contributions to the plan plus an 11% return, but a nonvested employee was only
to get a 5% return on his contributions.459 The former employees were not
vested because they were fired prior to vestment.46 ° When the arbitrators
awarded the employees their money under the compensation plan, they did not
46
utilize either the vested plan or the nonvested plan in calculating the award. '

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.A.A. § 12(a)(3).
455. Rhea-Dayton Educ. Assoc. v. Rhea County Bd. of Educ., No. 03A01-9401-CH-00021, 1994
WL 413180, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1994) (citing International Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright
Management, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).
456. Rhea-Daylon Educ. Assoc., 1994 WL 413180 at *3.
454.

458.
459.
460.

639 N.E.2d 228 (111.App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 230-31.

461.

Id. at 231.

457.
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The appellate court vacated the award stating that the arbitrators exceeded
their authority by awarding the employees an amount that was not based on the
unambiguous formulas in the agreements.46 2 Since the employees were fired
before 46vestment,
the employees should have received an amount with a 5%
3
return.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stein,4 64 State Farm
moved to vacate an award contending that the arbitrators exceeded their authority
when they arbitrated a stacking issue which was not in the policy.4 6 The
insurance policy of the insured only provided for the arbitration of two issues, and
neither addressed the stacking issue.4 66 The court held that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority because the stacking issue was not specifically within the
insurance policy.461 Since the arbitration clause within the insurance policy was
a limited arbitration clause, only those specific issues listed could be
arbitrated. 6 8
In City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc.,469 the court held that the arbitrators
did not exceed their authority by awarding damages incurred by a contractor as the
result of changed conditions and also did not exceed their powers by awarding
expert witness and attorney fees.47 ° The court stated that the arbitrators had the
power to award damages for changed conditions because the arbitration clause in
the contract provided for arbitration of "all disputes between them. 47' The
attorney and expert witness fees were not improperly awarded because the contract
authorized the arbitrators to award those expenses incident to arbitration to the
party whose claim was upheld.472
In Kennedy, Inc. v. Young, 473 a stock purchaser was awarded $100,000 in
punitive damages by an arbitration panel.474 The stockbroker firm moved to
vacate the punitive damage award on the grounds that the arbitrators exceeded
their powers.475 The appellate court found that the arbitrators had not exceed
their power because the parties' arbitration agreement reflected that the issue of
punitive damages was submitted to arbitration.476 Once the parties agreed and

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 233.
886 P.2d 326 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 328.
886 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 519.
524 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.at 754.
Id.
Id.at 755.
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submitted the issue of punitive damages to arbitration, the stockbroker firm could
not assert that the arbitrators exceeded their power.4 7
In Duchscher v. Vaile, 478 plaintiff and defendant submitted an automobile
accident dispute to arbitration. 4 9 The arbitration agreement provided that all
issues of liability and general and compensatory damages would be decided by
arbitration. 48 ° However, the agreement specifically provided that each party
would pay for their own attorney fees. 48' After arbitration finished, the
arbitrator found for the plaintiff and awarded her $60,000 in special damages and
$50,000 in general damages. 482 The arbitrator then announced that he intended
to award the plaintiff her attorney fees, but the attorneys informed the arbitrator
that each party was responsible for their own attorney fees.483 The arbitrator
then said he would amend the original decision by withdrawing the $50,000
general damage award.484 After reconsidering the matter, the arbitrator awarded
the plaintiff $90,000 in general damages rather the original $50,000.485 The
defendant moved to vacate the award arguing the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by increasing the general damage award in order to award the plaintiff her
attorney fees.486
The Montana Supreme Court refused to vacate the award finding that the
arbitrator's statement about awarding attorney fees was not a final and binding
arbitration award. 487 The final written award did not provide for attorney fees
and the arbitrator stated in the award that he understood that the parties would pay
for their own attorney fees.488
Parties sometimes claim that arbitrators exceed their authority when they
disregard the law. In Arnold v. Morgan Keegan and Co., Inc.,489 the appellate
court vacated an award because the arbitrators exceeded their authority by totally
disregarding the state law of securities.490 The appellants argued that their
stockbroker had materially misrepresented a stock investment in a certain
company.49' The stockbroker admitted he made the misrepresentation, and

477.

Id.

478.
479.

887 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1994).
Id. at 182.

480.

Id.

481.
482.

Id.
Id. at 183.

483.

Id.

484.
485.
486.
487.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184.

488.
489.

Id.
No. 03A01-9309-CH-00304, 1994 WL 265858 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 1994).

490.
491.

Id. at *8.
Id. at*1.
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according to the court, the state law mandated that the appellants recover for the
loss caused by the misrepresentation.492
The Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that many jurisdictions did not hold
a misapplication or mistake of law to be an excision of authority, but when
arbitrators reach a result that is "completely irrational," then they have exceeded
their authority.493 The arbitration agreement in this case required the arbitrators
to apply state law, and the arbitrators clearly failed to apply the state security
laws.494
In Stiffel, Nicolous and Co. v. Francis,495 the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that a "manifest disregard of the law" did not constitute an arbitrator
exceeding his authority. 496 The appellant in this case argued that the arbitration
panel exceeded its authority by failing to follow the state's law regarding contract
construction.497 The appellate court disagreed, explaining that if the arbitration
panel had disregarded the terms of the agreement or if the agreement had stated
that the arbitrators were to decide the dispute as a court of law or equity would,
498
The court
then the arbitration panel would have exceeded its authority.
refused to recognize the "manifest disregard for the law" standard because it was
not statutorily provided.499
Parties also have argued that arbitrators exceeded their powers not by failing
to apply the law, but because they failed to apply the law. In County of Hennepin
v. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., Local #19,500 two deputies were
suspended by the sheriffs department for violating a citizen's Fourth Amendment
rights.5" 1 The deputies' union appealed the decision and demanded arbitration
according to their collective bargaining agreement. 0 2 The arbitrator reversed the
deputies' suspension holding the sheriffs department did not have just cause to
impose the suspension.50 3 The sheriff's department moved to vacate the decision
arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by interpreting constitutional
issues under the Fourth Amendment.50 4
The appellate court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by
interpreting constitutional law.50 5 The arbitrator's decision whether the two
deputies had been properly suspended necessitated that he determine whether the

492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
872 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486.
No. C4-93-1412, 1994 WL 71344 (Minn. Ct. App. March 8, 1994).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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deputies violated the Fourth Amendment." 6 Since the parties submitted the
issue of the suspension to arbitration and the issue of suspension required
examination of the Fourth Amendment, the arbitrator did not exceed his
power.50 7
D. Refusal to Postpone a Hearing or Hear Relevant Evidence
An arbitration award shall be vacated when a court determines that the
arbitration proceeding was conducted in a prejudicial manner.50 8 A party may
be prejudiced when an arbitrator refuses to postpone a hearing upon the showing
of sufficient cause, refuses to hear evidence material to the controversy, or
5 9
otherwise conducts a hearing as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party. "
In Cannon School District No. 50 v. WES. Construction Co.,"' a dispute
The
between a school district and a contractor was submitted to arbitration.'
school district and the contractor had entered into a contract in which the
contractorwas to begin work within five days after the school district had obtained
During the course of arbitration, a
all of necessary regulatory permits.'
conflict of interest arose for the school district's attorney. 3 One of the
contractor's witnesses included the State Fire Marshall, a client of the school
district's attorney.514 Because of the conflict of interest, the school district's
attorney requested a continuance so the school district could acquire a new
attorney. 5 The arbitration panel denied the motion for a continuance and the
attorney's motion to withdraw as the school district's attorney.5" 6 After the
arbitration panel issued a judgment for the contractor, the school district moved
to vacate the award on the grounds that the panel had improperly refused to
postpone the hearing.51 7
The court of appeals held that the arbitration panel's denial of a continuance
was improper, but it was harmless error.5" 8 The court admitted that a conflict
of interest existed between the school district's attorney and the contractor's
witness,"1 9 but the school district was able to receive additional counsel.520

506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id.
U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
Id.
868 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), vacated by, 882 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1994).
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1024.
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The court held that the arbitration panel's refusal to grant the continuance did not
school district was able to present its
support a vacation of the award because the
52
1
prejudiced.
not
therefore
was
it
and
case,
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Arizona agreed with the lower
court that the arbitrators' error did not warrant denying confirmation of the award,
but vacated the court of appeals opinion. 22 The supreme court determined that
the trial court had properly confirmed the arbitrator's award and properly awarded
attorney's fees for the confirmation proceedings, but erred by awarding attorney's
fees for the arbitration itself. 2' Under the terms of the U.A.A. itself, trial courts
are precluded from awarding attorney fees if such fees are not included in the
agreement to arbitrate.124 Unlike the express provision excluding attorney fees
not provided for in an arbitration agreement, the Arizona confirmation statute did
attorneys fees in the confirmation
not mention attorney fees.5 25 5Thus,
26
proceeding were properly awarded.
In Christian Dior, Inc. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx,5 27 a trademark licensor
invoked arbitration against its licensee for breach of its license agreement. 528
The licensee requested and was granted postponement of the original hearing so
that its attorney could relocate his office.5 29 The licensee then requested another
postponement, and the arbitration panel granted it. 3 When the licensee
requested that the hearing scheduled on a Sunday be postponed to accommodate
its attorney who was preparing for a jury trial, the arbitration panel refused to
postpone it." - ' After the arbitration panel found in favor of the licensor, the
licensee moved to vacate the award, arguing that the panel refused to postpone the
arbitration hearing on the showing of good cause.532 The licensee also moved
to vacate the award on the fact that the arbitration panel had refused to issue a
subpoena for a material witness.533
Addressing the issue of postponement, the court held that the arbitrators did
not violate the U.A.A 34 The court found that the licensee only demonstrated

521. Id.
522. Canon School District No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 882 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Ariz. 1994).
523. Id.
524. Id. at 1277.
525. Id. at 1279.
526. Id.
527. 637 N.E.2d 546 (I11.App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 1275 (III. 1994).
528. Id. at 548.
529. Id. at 549.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 551. The licensee contended that it had good cause to postpone the hearing because
the hearing followed the relocation of its attorney's office and immediately preceded its attorney's jury
trial. Id.
533. Id. at 550-51.
534. Id. at 551.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/8

40

Gibbens et al.: Gibbens: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Uniform Arbitration Act

1995]

that the Sunday arbitration date was inconvenient, not prejudicial.53 The panel
refused the third postponement in order to comply with the arbitration deadline,
and the court noted that the Sunday hearing was actually scheduled that date to
accommodate the licensee's attorney.536 With regard to the panel's refusal 5 to
37
subpoena a witness, the court held that the panel did not violate the U.A.A.
The fact that the licensee had failed to show how the witness was material and the
fact that the witness was not on the witness list for the two postponed hearings,
led the court to conclude that the licensee had not suffered substantial
prejudice. 38
State
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. State Farm Insurance Co.,
Farm filed for arbitration, alleging that the insured customer of New Hampshire
was the party responsible for the medical expenses of the State Farm insured. 4
After New Hampshire Insurance received State Farm's notice of arbitration, it
claimed that it mailed a request for a deferment of the arbitration hearing. 41
The arbitration panel denied receiving any deferment request and New
Hampshire's attorney was unable to produce copies of the deferment request.542
New Hampshire did not appear at the arbitration hearing, and a judgment was
entered in favor of State Farm. 43 New Hampshire attempted to vacate the
award on the ground that the arbitration panel had refused to postpone the
hearing. 44 New Hampshire claimed that it had sufficient cause to defer the
hearing because it had a personal injury suit involving the same claim pending in
court at the same time as the arbitration proceeding. 45
The court vacated the judgment because state rules require deferment of all
arbitration claims until all companion suits were settled.54 State Farm argued
that the deferment request was never received, but the court stated that there was
a rebuttable presumption that a "mailed matter, correctly addressed, stamped and
mailed, was received by the party to whom it was addressed."54 7 Since State
Farm did not offer any evidence to rebut this presumption, it was presumed that
the arbitration panel received the deferment. 48 The court directed that the
judgment be vacated and the parties proceed with a new hearing.549

535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 552.
No. 13902, 1994 WL 125038 (Del.Ch. March 31, 1994).
Id. at *1.

541.

Id.

542.

Id.

543.

Id.

544.

Id. at *4.

545.

Id.

546.

Id. This was in accordance with Rule II of the Delaware Arbitration Rules. Id.

547.
548.
549.

Id.(citing State ex rel. Hall v. Camper, 347 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. 1975)).
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 1994 WL 125038 at *4.
Id.
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E. Lack of an Arbitration Agreement

A court shall vacate an award where there was no arbitration agreement. 5
In order for the court to vacate the award for lack of an agreement, a prior court
must not have adversely determined that there was an agreement in proceedings
under Section 2 of the U.A.A., and the party must not have participated in the
hearings without objecting to the lack of an agreement."' Under some common
law jurisdictions, a party that participated in arbitration and failed to withdraw
before an award was made was bound by the award, despite his objection to the
proceeding.552
In Bruch v. CNA Insurance Co.,

the trial court vacated an insurance

arbitration award because the insurance contract only provided for binding
arbitration up to the statutory minimum for bodily injury liability. 54 Since the
statutory minimum limit for bodily injury was $25,000 and the arbitrators awarded
the insured $90,000 plus costs, the trial court vacated the award and granted the
insurance company's request for a jury trial. 55
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court, explaining that under
New Mexico's version of U.A.A. Section 12(a)(5), an award shall be vacated if
there was no arbitration agreement. 56 Although the parties did have an
arbitration agreement, the parties did not agree to arbitrate above the statutory
minimum. 5 7 The court also noted that there had been no adverse determination
and that the insurance company properly objected after it alerted the arbitrators
that it would not agree to a binding award above the statutory minimum.55
In R.D. Robinson, Inc. v. DQHSX, Inc.,"' the arbitrator in a construction

contract dispute awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees plus interest. 60 The
defendant moved to vacate the award, arguing that the agreement did not provide
for interest and attorney's fees.5 ' The appellate court refused to vacate the
award, finding that the contract did provide for interest 62 and that since the
contract did not expressly exclude the allowance of attorney's fees, the arbitrator

550.
551.
552.
Lubbock,
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.

U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
Id.
Al's Fonnal Wear of Houston, Inc., 869 S.W.2d at 445 (citing L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of
559 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1977)).
870 P.2d 749 (N.M. 1994).
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
Id. at 752.
No. 03A01-9405-CH-00175, 1994 WL 585778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1994).
Id. at *1.

561.

Id.

562.

Id. at *2.
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was free to award them.563 Additionally, the parties represented to the arbitrator
564
that the contract should be read to include attorney's fees.
565
In Hwang v. Tyler, the court refused to vacate an award based on a lack
of an agreement since the matter had been adversely determined under a prior
U.A.A. Section 2 hearing.566 Tyler was hired to manage the renovation of a
motel for Royal Motel, and he and three shareholders of Royal Motel entered into
5 67
an agreement stipulating that disputes would be settled through arbitration.
Tyler and the three shareholders signed the agreement, but the signature line for
Royal Motel was left blank.5 68 Tyler was later fired and he filed for
arbitration.5 69 The three shareholders and Royal Motel moved to stay arbitration
under Section 2 of the U.A.A. arguing that there was no agreement to
arbitrate. 57' The trial court found that the agreement bound the shareholders and
Tyler, but failed to bind Royal Motel. 57' The motion to stay arbitration was
5
denied and the matter was submitted to arbitration." The arbitrator found for
573
appealed the
One of the shareholders 574
Tyler and awarded him damages.
agreement.
arbitration
no
was
there
that
arbitrator's award arguing
The Illinois Court of Appeals refused to vacate the award holding that the
issue of whether there was an arbitration agreement had already been adversely
determined in the trial court below.575 The shareholder argued that the award
should have been vacated because he raised an objection during the arbitration
proceeding. 76 In order to vacate an award under Section 12(a)(5), however, the
issue must not have been adversely determined and the party must have raised an
objection during the arbitration hearing.577 The shareholder failed to meet both
578
prongs of the test because the issue of an agreement had already been decided.

563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

Id. at *1.
Id.
625 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 246.
Id.

568.

Id. at 244.

569. Id.
570. Id. The shareholders and Royal Motel argued that there was no agreement because it was
only a draft or, alternatively, the agreement was not enforceable because Royal Motel had not signed.
Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. The court granted the motion to stay as to counts III and IV and denied the motion to
stay as to counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 245.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578.

Id. at 246.
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F. Timing

A party must file his application to vacate an award within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to'the applicant. 9 An exception to the ninety
day rule occurs if the award was predicated upon corruption, fraud, or undue
means, then the application to vacate is to be made ninety days after such grounds
are known or should have been known."'
" ' the United States Court of Appeals applied the
In Sullivan v. Lemoncello,58
Illinois version of U.A.A. Section 12(b) to bar the defendant from attacking the
arbitration award. 5" The plaintiffs sought to enforce the award under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.583 Under this act, the statute of
limitations is determined by reference to state law.584 The court held that the
Illinois version of the U.A.A. was the appropriate statute of limitations, and since
the defendant sought to vacate the award past the ninety day limit, the defendant
585
was barred from challenging the enforcement of the award.
G. Public Policy

Occasionally, courts will go outside the confines of Section 12 to vacate an
award. In Williams v. Williams,586 an automobile accident victim moved to
compel arbitration under a state compulsory arbitration statute for motor vehicle
cases involving less than $25,000.587 The arbitrator in Williams awarded the
accident victim $21,500.588 The lower court denied the defendant's motion for
a new trial, finding that the defendant did not establish a right to vacate the award
pursuant to the state compulsory arbitration statute, 89 which incorporates the
state's version of U.A.A. Section 12."0 In order to establish such a right, one
had to meet the criteria of Section 12.' 9' The defendants argued that these
requirements placed an unconstitutional restriction on their right to obtain a jury
trial.

59 2

579.

U.A.A. § 12(b).

580.

Id.

581.
583.

36 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 681.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).

584.

Sullivan, 36 F.3d at 681 (citing United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.

582.

696, 704-05 (1966)).
585. Id.
587.

877 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1994).
Id. at 1082. The statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 38.215 (1969), was repealed on July 1, 1993.

588.
589.

Id.
Id.; see NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.145, 38.235 (1969).

586.

590.

Williams, 877 P.2d at 1082.

591.
592.

Id.
Id. at 1083.
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The Nevada Supreme Court held the compulsory arbitration statute an
unconstitutional infringement on a parties right to a jury trial.593 Altough the
court found Section 12 constitutional when applied to voluntary arbitration,
requirements to compulsory arbitration made it
applying its rigid
94
unconstitutional.
XII.

SECTION

13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD

Section 13 of the U.A.A. allows judicial modification or correction of an
award where (1) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or evident mistake
in description, (2) arbitrators decide a matter not submitted to them, or (3) the
award is imperfect in form.5 95 If one of these grounds exists, the court
5 96 may only
modify the award in a way that effects the intent of the arbitrators.
Despite the authority of courts to modify arbitration agreements, most have
recognized that their review of arbitration awards is quite limited, and is not to
exceed the grounds listed in Section 13 of the U.A.A. A corollary of this idea is
that the trial judge reviewing an arbitration award cannot modify the award merely
because he would have decided the case differently.597 Therefore, courts find
few occasions for the modifying or correcting of awards.
In Marsh v. Loffier Housing Corp.," a Maryland appellate court affirmed
the trial court's modification of an arbitration award to include attorney's fees.5 99
The arbitration clause in the parties' contract provided for arbitration of "[any
controversy or claim arising out of or related to the contract."6'00 The arbitrator
was silent on the awarding of fees in the original award, which finds that payment
should be made to the contractor, and after a motion by the contractor requesting
that the award be clarified to include attorney fees.6"' The homeowner filed a
motion with the trial court to vacate the award and the contractor filed a motion
to modify the award to include attorney fees.60 2 The trial court modified the
award, adding attorney fees after an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent
of the fees.60 3

The trial court justified modification under U.A.A. Section 13(a)(2),6
finding that the arbitrator ruled upon an issue not submitted for arbitration.6

593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.

Id.
Id.
U.A.A. § 13(a).
U.AA. § 13(b).
City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 1994).
648 A.2d 1081 (Md. App. 1994).
Id.at 1090.
Id. at 1083.
Id.at 1084.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROc. § 3-223(b)(2) (1989).

605.

Marsh, 648 A.2d at 1084.
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The homeowner appealed, arguing that the issue of attorney fees had been
submitted for arbitration because the contractor had requested attorney fees at
several points: first, in its post-hearing brief to the arbitrator; second, in its
response to the homeowner's motion to clarify before the arbitrator; and third, in
its motion to modify the award.6 °6 The contractor responded by pointing out
that neither party's submission of claims to the arbitrator included a request for
attorney fees; and since the arbitrator's failure to award attorney fees was in
6 °7
essence a ruling on those fees, the arbitrator ruled on an unsubmitted issue.
The appellate court reasoned that since the arbitration agreement required all
arbitration claims to be submitted in writing and neither party had included a
request for attorney fees in his submission of claims, the issue of fees was not
before the arbitrator.6" 8 Further, even though the contractor had presented
evidence at the arbitration hearing regarding the amount of its attorney fees, the
60 9
appellate court found that it had never raised the issue of liability for fees.
As to whether the arbitrator ruled on fees, the appellate court held that his
silence on the issue could be construed as a ruling or a failure to rule; but either
way, the trial court's modification was correct. 60 The appellate court held that
the contract between the parties clearly provided for payment of attorney's fees to
the contractor in the event of "legal action, or other collection action," and that
arbitration qualified as a "collection action." '' If the arbitrator did not rule on
the fees, the trial court decided correctly because an arbitration award that does
not conform to the clear requirements of the contract should be modified to
conform to it.612 On the other hand, if the arbitrator did rule on the fees, but
ruled not to give them, he ruled on an issue not submitted to arbitration, and the
award should be modified under Md. Code Ann. § 3-223(b)(2)(1989). 1 3
Despite the trend exemplified by most courts to limit judicial review of
arbitration awards to the grounds listed in Section 13, two courts have found
grounds for review outside that section. In Kovacs v. Kovacs,61 4 a Maryland
615
appellate court found such grounds under the doctrine of parenspatriae. The
support
child
trial court confirmed the arbitrator's ruling on custody, visitation,
and alimony without independently considering the children's best interests before
confirming an award in a divorce proceeding.6" 6 Read in conjunction with the

606.
607.

608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
223(b)(2)
614.
615.
616.

Id. at 1087.
Id.

Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1088-89.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1089; see Maryland's version of the U.A.A. § 13(a)(2) at MD. CODE ANN. § 3(1989).
633 A.2d 425 (Md. App. 1993).
Id. at 431.
Id. at 430.
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Maryland Family Law Article,617 Section 13 required the trial court to
independently consider these issues.6" 8 Similarly, a Florida appellate court held
in Montalvo v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 6 1 9 that where the arbitration clause of
an insurance policy allowed arbitration of only certain issues, the insurance
company could raise for the first time the issue of policy limits at the confirmation
hearing since the policy stated the issue could not be submitted to the
arbitrator.62 ° Therefore, the trial court had discretion to decrease the award by
50% in accordance with the policy limit.621
Grounds for review were also found through liberal interpretation of Section
13 in light of other state statutes. Contract Development Corp. v. Beck622
involved a contract in Illinois under which Contract Development Corporation
("CDC") had agreed to supervise and coordinate the construction of the Becks'
property.623 The Becks refused to pay for services rendered and the case went
to arbitration.624 The arbitrator awarded damages to CDC for breach of
contract.625 The trial court confirmed this award and awarded damages for
slander of title of $18,737.626 On appeal, the appellate court held that, read in
conjunction with Section 2-1303 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure which
imposes a 9% post-judgment interest on all final judgments, Section 13 requires
the trial court to assess the 9% statutorily mandated post-judgment interest upon
confirmation of an award.627 Therefore, it would be error for a trial court to
confirm an award that fails to assess that interest upon motion for
modification.62 8
Other courts were more apprehensive of review under Section 13. Some
courts skirted review of the arbitration award under Section 13(a)(1), reasoning
629
that the arbiter's decision did not constitute an "evident miscalculation.'

617.

Id. at 430-31; see MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 8-103(a) (1984).

618.
619.

Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 431.
643 So. 2d 648 (Fla. App. 1994).

620.

Id. at 650.

621.

Id.

622.

627 N.E. 2d 760 (I1. App. 1994).

623.

Id. at 762.

624.

Id.

625.

Id.

626.

Id. at 762-63.

627.

Id. at 769.

628. Id.
629. See School City of East Chicago, Indiana v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local No.
511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. 1993) (the use of a 38 rather than a 39-week divisor to calculate
salary was not an "evident miscalculation of figures" such as to justify modification of the award;
rather, substituting the 39-week divisor for the 38-week divisor used by the arbiter would alter his
conclusion on the substantive merits, not just the correction of the improper application of
mathematical principles); Landmark v. Mader Agency, Inc., 878 P.2d 773 (Id. 1994) (miscalculation
not evident because trial court unaware of it until considering a motion questioning arbiter's factual
findings); Cily of Baytown, 886 S.W.2d at 515 (an evident miscalculation of figures must be clear,
concise and conclusive from the record; in the absence of a transcript of arbitration proceedings the
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Another justification for letting the award stand was reluctance to interfere with
the arbiter's findings of fact or resolution of the merits of the controversy.63
Review was held impermissible even where the arbiter made gross errors of law
or fact which did not appear on the face of the award.63' Further support for the
authority of arbitration awards was found in the affirmation that the party seeking
modification of an award has the burden of proving that one of the grounds listed
in Section 13 exists,63 2 and a holding that the U.A.A.'s failure to give de novo
review was not unconstitutional.633
XIII.

SECTION

14: JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON AWARD

U.A.A. Section 14 provides that once a court confirms, modifies or corrects
an award, a judgment to that effect must be entered and enforced as any other
judgment. 34 During the past year, courts have agreed that awards are not
treated as judgments under the U.A.A. until the granting of an order under Section
14.635 Further, they have recognized their review of an arbitration award is
limited to the grounds provided in the U.A.A.636
The Supreme Court of Idaho held in Western Industrialand Environmental
Services637 that once the trial court enters judgment of an arbitration award that
judgment is a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel. 638 The court
reasoned that Section 14 requires a judgment entered pursuant to an arbitration
award to be treated the same as other judgments. 639 Further, formal procedures
normally found in a trial were present at the arbitration: the parties were given
notice; they could formulate issues of law and fact in their memos to the
arbitrator; they could present evidence and arguments; and the arbitration award
was considered to be the final resolution between the parties.640
In Canon School DistrictNo. 50 v. W.E.S. Construction Co. 641 the Arizona
Supreme Court held that although the U.A.A. excludes the awarding of attorney
fees by the arbitrator in Section 10, it does not exclude the awarding of attorneys

court presumed adequate evidence to support the award).

630. See Lemna v. Harry F. Shea & Co., 628 N.E.2d 577 (II1. App. 1993); Duchscher v. Vaile,
887 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1994); Landmark, 878 P.2d 773.
631.

Lemna, 628 N.E.2d at 577.

632. Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 184.
633. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 13092, 1994 WL 125038 (Del. Ch.,
March 31, 1994)).
634.

U.A.A. § 14.

635.

See Western Indus. & Envt'l Ser., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assocs., Inc., 887 P.2d 1048, 1051

(Idaho 1994); Mausbach v. Lemke, 866 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Nev. 1994).
636. Mausbach, 866 P.2d at 1149.

637.

Western Indus. & Envi'l Ser. Inc., 887 P.2d at 1048.

638.

Id. at 1051.

639.

Id.

640.

Id.

641.

882 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1994).
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fees by the trial court in confirming the award under Section 14.642 Therefore,
the trial court may award fees in confirming the award, but only those fees
incurred in the confirmation award, and not in the arbitration process.643 For
this result, the court depended on the prefatory comment to the 1954 draft of the
U.A.A. which states that court intervention in arbitration "must be prompt and
values of arbitration will be largely dissipated through prolonged
simple or the
644
litigation. ,
Finally, the Supreme Court of Nevada held in Mausbach that it would be an
impermissible modification of an arbitration award for the trial court to add
prejudgment interest to an award. 645 The Nevada prejudgment interest statute
provides that the trial court shall impose prejudgment interest from the time the
summons and complaint are served on all judgments and decrees, rendered by any
court of justice.646 The plaintiff maintained that this statute applied to arbitration
awardsbecauseNev. Rev. Stat. § 38.165 (1994), adopted from U.A.A. Section 14,
requires that the judgment entered in confirming an arbitration award be enforced
"as any other judgment or decree." 64' Therefore, plaintiff argued the trial court
648
was required to add prejudgment interest to an award that did not include it.
Although the arbiter could award prejudgment interest from the time the summons
and complaint were served, it would be an impermissible modification for the trial
court to add such interest to an award that did not mention it because the only
"enforcement" needed was the payment of the award as it stood and the defendant
interest not included
had already paid that amount.649 Payment of prejudgment
650
in the award could not be seen as "enforcement."
Nevada law (Section 38.165) makes it clear that the trial court cannot deviate
from the award upon confirmation under this section except to award costs and
attorney fees related to obtaining the confirmation. 65 1 Therefore, what plaintiff
was seeking was not confirmation of the award under Section 38.165, but
modification of the award.652 Thus, Section 38.165 did not apply because the
653
plaintiff was not asking for enforcement "as any other judgment or decree.,
However, it would be permissible for the trial court to add postjudgment
interest."'

642.

Id.at 1279.

643.

Id.
Id. at 1279-80 (quoting HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

644.

ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 204 (1954)).

645.

Mausbach, 866 P.2d at 1150.

646.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.130 (1994).

647.
648.

Mausbach, 866 P.2d at 1148.
Id.

649.
650.
651.
652.

Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1148-49.

653.
654.

Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1150.
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JURISDICTION

A court'sjurisdictionto consider arbitration agreementsunderU.A.A. Section
1 is conferred to courts in the language of Section 17. U.A.A. Section 17
provides that entering an arbitration agreement under U.A.A. Section 1 confers
jurisdiction on state courts to enforce the agreement and enter judgment on awards
thereunder.6 5
Kovacs v. Kovacs 6 6 held that the trial court has authority to order the
parties to submit to arbitration that does not conform to the procedural
requirements of the U.A.A., provided that the arbitration meets the standards of
basic fairness or due process.657 This authority came from reading Section 17
in conjunction with Maryland Rule E2, which provides that trial courts may
confirm awards to which the U.A.A. is inapplicable, and Maryland Rule E3, which
provides that any parties to a pending action who in writing request arbitration
before trial will be ordered to arbitrate. 6 8 The court also held that parties can
waive their rights under the U.A.A. and submit to arbitration issues that do not
meet the U.A.A. 's requirements.659
Colorado amended its version of Section 17 to include jurisdiction for courts
over arbitration pursuant to the parties' choice or state rules.66 °
XV. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Under U.A.A. Section 19, an appeal may be made to state appellate court
when a trial court (1) denies an application to compel arbitration, (2) grants a stay
of arbitration, (3) confirms or denies an application to confirm an award, (4)
modifies or corrects an award, (5) vacates an award without giving a rehearing,
66
or (6) enters a judgment on an award.
' Courts have applied this section of the
662
year.
last
the
in
U.A.A. expansively

655. U.A.A. § 17.
656. 633 A.2d 425 (1993).
657. Id. at 433.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-219 (1995) now provides:
The term "court", as used in this part 2, means any court of competent
jurisdiction of this state. The making of an agreement described in section
13-22-203 [U.A.A. § 1 providing for arbitration in this state, pursuant to the
choice of the parties or pursuant to the choice of arbitration, mediation, or
conciliation rules under which this state is determined to be appropriate,
confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under this part 2 and to enter
judgment on an award under this part 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
661. U.A.A. § 19(a).
662. See generally Baxter, John Witzel, Inc., 871 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App, 1994); Smith v.
Edson, 888 P.2d 345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); McCamey v. Nearing, Staats, Prelogar & Jones, 866
S.W.2d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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A Kansas appellate court held in Baxter v. John Weitzel, Inc.663 that the
denial of a motion to dismiss was appealable as if it was a motion to compel
arbitration. 664 Baxter involved a breach of contract claim filed by an employee,
Baxter, against his employer, Weitzel. 665 Baxter filed a complaint with the trial
court, and Weitzel followed with a motion to dismiss under the theory that the
parties had agreed to arbitrate all controversies.666 The trial court held that
6 67
U.A.A. Section 1 makes the arbitration clause an option for either party.
Since Baxter indicated his intent to waive the option to arbitrate, arbitration would
not be compelled.668 The appellate court held that although Weitzel did not file
a motion to compel arbitration under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-402 (1994), adopted
from U.A.A. Section 2, in the district court, its motion to dismiss had the same
effect.669 The motion to dismiss made reference to the arbitration clause and
claimed that a dispute had arisen between the parties which was subject to that
clause. 67 ° Therefore, the motion was treated as a motion to compel, insofar as
its denial was appealable.67'
In Smith v. Edson,672 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the U.A.A.
controlled whether an order compelling arbitration was appealeable, despite the
fact that arbitration was mandated by state statute and not the result of an
agreement between the parties. The court held that such an order was not
appealable.673
More strikingly, a Missouri Court of Appeals held in McCarney v. Nearing,
Staats, Prelogar& Jones674 that although an order compelling arbitration is not
appealable under U.A.A. Section 19, a party can challenge that order by seeking
a writ of prohibition.67 McCarney involved a construction contract under which
McCarney hired contractor Reinhardt.67 6 Reinhardt filed a complaint alleging
that McCarney failed to pay Reinhardt under the contract. 677 McCamey filed an
answer and counterclaim, to which Reinhardt responded by filing a motion to stay
the lawsuit pending arbitration.6 78 The trial court issued an order granting this
motion and McCarney filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the order

663.

871 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).

664.

Id. at 858.

665.
666.
667.

Id.at 856.
Id
Id.at 857.

668.

Id.

669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.

Id.at 858.
Id.
Id.
Smith v. Edson, 888 P.2d 345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 346.
866 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

675.
676.

Id. at 887.
Id. at 885.

677.

Id. at 886.

678.

Id.
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in the appellate court.67 9 The appellate court granted a preliminary order in
prohibition pending oral arguments on the writ.68
After arguments, the
appellate court held that although the writ of prohibition is an extreme remedy, it
"
was available here.68
' Reinhardt argued that McCamey had an adequate remedy
at law in that he could appeal any arbitration award; but the court felt that such
an argument was better considered at the preliminary stage, and since preliminary
relief had already been granted, the court decided the case on its merits.682
Other courts have applied Section 19 in a more straightforward fashion. In
Bureau of Employee Relations v. Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local
1989,6 the Supreme Court of Maine held that the section provides no right of
appeal from a trial court's order compelling arbitration; therefore, such an order
is not appealable.684 A Texas appellate court reached the same conclusion in
Gathe v. Cigna Healthplan of Texas.6 8 The denial of a motion to vacate an
arbiter's decision that the suit was arbitrable was unappealable under this rationale
because it functioned as a motion compelling arbitration.686
A Missouri appellate court held in MLJ Investments, Inc. v. Reid6 87 that
while Section 19 provides the right of appeal from an order confirming an
arbitration award, that right did not apply where the arbiter's decision did not
dispose of all the claims pending before him.6 88 The court made this
determination because confirmation of such an award does not constitute a final
judgment.689 Further, in American Insurance Co. v. Cazort690 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that Section 19 does provide a right of appeal from the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration, even in light of a state statute limiting
the right of appeal to final judgments.6 9'
XVI.

SECTION

21:

UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION

Section 21 of the U.A.A. provides that the U.A.A. should be interpreted
uniformly throughout the states which have enacted it.692 This section ensures
uniform application of the U.A.A. throughout the nation. In fact, a Tennessee

679.
680.

Id.
Id.

681.

Id.

682.

Id.

683.

639 A.2d 638 (Me. 1994).

684.
685.
686.

Id. at 640.
879 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App. 1994).
Bureau of Employee Relations, 639 A.2d at 640.

687.

877 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

688.
689.

Id.
Id.

690.

871 S.W.2d 575 (Ark. 1994) (examining Rule 2 of Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure).

691.

Id. at 578.

692.

U.A.A. § 21.
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appellate court held in Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co.69 3 that courts do not
look to other states' decisions under the U.A.A. as persuasive authority, but rather
as a "supplement" to their own case law in Arnold.694
KIMBERLY GIBBENS
CATHLEEN A. MARTIN
PETER SMNERS
STEPHEN WrITE

693.
694

No. 03A01-9309-CH-00304, 1994 WL 265858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id at *5
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